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In articulating his novel theory of a right to privacy, Professor
Rickless takes as a starting point several paradigm cases in which
privacy rights are violated and paradigm cases in which privacy rights
are not violated. These include The Loud Fight, The Quiet Fight, The
Pornographic Picture in the wall-safe, and The Subway Map obscured
by a raincoat.1 Rickless allows that standard views of the right to
privacy—“control” accounts, “inaccessibility” accounts, William Parent’s
“information-based” account, and Judith Jarvis Thomson’s reductionist
account—can successfully explain why the paradigm cases are, or are
not, violations of the right to privacy.2
For example, on control accounts, The Quiet Fight constitutes an
infringement of the right to privacy in that by training his amplifier on
the house in which the fight takes place, Jones infringes the fighting

* Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. Samuel C. Rickless, The Right to Privacy Unveiled, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
773, 778 (2007).
2. Id. at 779–82. See generally W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 269–70 (1983); Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Right to Privacy, 4
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295 (1975).
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couple’s claim to noninterference with their decision that others not hear
their conversation.3 On accessibility views, The Quiet Fight constitutes
an infringement of a privacy right because Jones infringes the couple’s
claim that others not experience and learn about their conversation.4
Parent’s information-based account explains the violation in terms of
Jones’s possession of undocumented information that the couple has
chosen not to reveal.5 And Thomson, of course, posits that the couple in
the quiet fight simply has the right to not be listened to.6 As with The
Quiet Fight, Rickless explains how and why each of the standard
accounts arrives at the right answer in each of the paradigm cases.
Despite the fact that the standard accounts get several paradigm cases
right, Rickless contends that those accounts are incorrect. The problem
for the standard accounts, and the impetus for Rickless’s novel approach,
comes in their failure to account for other paradigm cases. The first such
paradigm case is The Threatened Loss Counterexample, in which A
invents but does not use a powerful X-ray device that can look into
homes. The mere threat that A could look through a person’s walls
deprives that person of the ability to determine who will acquire
information about that person. Thus, it is sufficient to infringe a claim to
privacy on the control view. But surely A infringes no right to privacy
by inventing, though not using, the X-ray machine. Similarly, Rickless
contends that the existence of the X-ray machine infringes a right to
privacy on accessibility views, for on those views the right to privacy
consists in one having a claim against others that they not be able to
garner personal information about the rightholder. Again, however, A
infringes no right by inventing the X-ray machine.7
Parent’s information-based theory fares a little better, as it accommodates
The Threatened Loss Counterexample. However, it is unable to
accommodate a different case, The Ex-Nazi. In The Ex-Nazi, Goldberg
possesses A’s powerful X-ray device. Rather than exercising A’s restraint,
though, Goldberg actually trains the device on Rudolf’s safe. In doing
so, Goldberg learns that Rudolf was once a member of the Nazi party.
Because Nazi party membership is documented, and one may have
privacy only in undocumented information, Goldberg’s learning the
information through the X-ray device does not violate Rudolf’s right to
privacy on Parent’s view. But Rickless asserts it does violate that right.8
Thus, Parent’s account of the right to privacy is unsatisfactory.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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Rickless, supra note 1, at 779.
Id.
Parent, supra note 2, at 270; Rickless, supra note 1, at 780.
Rickless, supra note 1, at 781–82; Thomson, supra note 2, at 304.
Rickless, supra note 1, at 783–84.
Id. at 784.
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Regardless of the problems encountered by the standard, nonreductionist
views, Rickless is unmoved by Thomson’s reductionism. On Thomson’s
view, privacy rights are really just a cluster of rights, which include the
rights that one not be listened to and that one not have one’s property
examined.9 However, where another person accidentally comes upon
the pornographic picture that had been in one’s safe, but was blown into
the street by a freak tornado, surely no right has been violated.10 And
where a similarly fortuitous weather event allows a couple’s quiet fight
to be broadcast to neighbors, surely the couple’s right to privacy has not
been violated.11 Thus, Thomson’s view appears to find rights where
none exist, and is therefore an inadequate account of the right to privacy.
As an alternative, Rickless offers the Barrier Theory, according to
which:
For X to have a right to privacy against Y is for X to have a claim
against Y that Y not learn or experience some personal fact about X
by breaching a barrier used by X to keep others from learning or
experiencing some personal fact about X.12
The Barrier Theory gets the right answer in all of the paradigm cases
Rickless offers. The cases in which a privacy right is infringed—The
Quiet Fight, The Pornographic Picture, and The Ex-Nazi—are cases in
which a person breaches a barrier and learns personal information.
Thus, under the Barrier Theory the cases constitute violations of privacy
rights.
In The Loud Fight, The Accidentally Amplified Fight, The Pornographic
Tornado, and The Threatened Loss Counterexample cases, no one
breaches such a barrier. And in The Subway Map and The Pornographic
Tornado no one learns or experiences a personal fact. In those cases,
then, the Barrier Theory gets the right answer: No right to privacy has
been violated.13
Having set out the basics, Rickless considers several questions one
might pose for the Barrier Theory. For example, must the barrier be
solid? No. Must the barrier be erected by, rather than merely used by,
9.
10.
785.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 785; Thomson, supra note 2, at 306.
This is Rickless’s The Pornographic Tornado case. Rickless, supra note 1, at
This is Rickless’s The Accidentally Amplified Quiet Fight. Id. at 786.
Id. at 787.
Id.
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the rightholder? No. Must the barrier be morally permissible in the first
instance? No. While Rickless’s answers seem correct, I think that they
raise some concerns about the Barrier Theory.
I. THE NATURE OF THE BARRIER
Rickless asks whether the relevant barrier must be solid. He explains
that the barrier need not be solid by providing the example of The Man
in the Bushes, who sneaks and eavesdrops on a couple that have
chosen to talk on a secluded bench so that others will not overhear
their conversation.14 This is a clear case of a privacy right violation, but
the barrier breached is the air between the couple and any potential
eavesdroppers. Rickless concedes that any number of things may be
appropriate barriers, such that their breach, coupled with learning some
personal facts, will constitute a violation of someone’s right to privacy.
By way of example, he mentions window blinds, smell-masking agents,
air, and data encryption.15
However, I am uncertain how to understand the nature of these barriers
that are a necessary aspect of privacy rights. Consider the following case.
Suppose that A takes an interest in B. A follows B around as B goes
about his daily routine, and gathers data all the while. A notes the things
B buys, the books B checks out from the library. He casually eavesdrops
on B’s conversations, retrieves a bit of B’s hair from the barbershop
floor and runs a quick DNA test. He does the same to B’s spouse and
children to check parentage. He conjures pretexts to interview B’s
friends, coworkers, and family to find out as many details about B as he
possibly can. Through A’s efforts he learns a great deal about B’s life:
his proclivities, his intellectual commitments, his political views, details
about his relationships, and so forth.16
Surely A violates B’s right to privacy. I think it would be implausible
to contend that B has no moral right that A refrain from his massive data
collection and analysis. When B eventually discovers A’s activities, B’s
complaint would seem to be that A violated B’s right to privacy, and that
complaint would be justified. I do not see, though, that A breaches a
barrier.
One possibility is that A does breach a barrier, which is just the sheer
difficulty of getting all that information. One might use the difficulty of
gathering and analyzing small bits of information as a way of preventing

14. Id. at 788.
15. Id.
16. This case tracks an example I use in Alan Rubel, Claims to Privacy and the
Distributed Value View, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 921, 942 (2007).
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others from learning other personal facts about oneself. For example,
Joe might use the fact that it is difficult to follow him around and monitor
his purchases and behavior as a way to hide his chronic drinking. Similarly,
one might create a barrier to being followed by walking or driving briskly,
turning often and without warning, and so forth. Understanding “barrier” so
broadly, however, would seem to undermine the explanatory power of the
Barrier Theory.17
II. “USED BY”
Supposing that the data accumulation case does constitute a violation
of B’s right to privacy, and supposing that the sheer difficulty of getting
all that information is the barrier that A breaches, it is not at all clear that
B uses the difficulty of getting the information as a means to keep others
from learning or experiencing personal facts about himself. It seems
more likely that it simply never occurred to B that someone would go to
such lengths to find out detailed information about him.
It seems that many of the things that constitute actual barriers to others
learning personal facts about us are fortuitous. Consider, for example, the
efforts of credit card companies to keep others from learning information
about my account. I certainly benefit from those efforts to the extent
that they prevent me from being defrauded. However, it is plausible that
many people do not think about, much less deliberately use, those efforts
as a means of keeping others from learning personal facts. However, it
seems that B’s stealing a look at A’s financial records violates A’s right
to privacy, even where A did not deliberately use the protections
afforded such records to keep others from learning personal facts.
The same could be true of the protections afforded medical records,
educational records, and so forth. For example, many people may not
realize the extent to which there are barriers to others learning information
in their medical records, though they benefit from the barriers. However, it
would still seem that others breaching the barriers would constitute
17. Rickless responds to the counterexample, which he aptly calls The Shadow, by
noting that B’s actions occur in public, and are the sorts of information-gathering tactics
employed by private investigators. Rickless, supra note 1, at 794 n.45. This is correct. I
take it, though, that The Man in the Bushes example takes place in public. Similarly, one
could breach the barrier of a smell-masking agent (for example, with an electronic nose
of some sort) in public. I am also uncertain whether the information-gathering activities
of private investigators render those activities permissible per se. Being a private investigator
may in some circumstances give rise to certain privilege rights.
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violations of privacy rights. Indeed, the same thing will be true of the
walls of one’s house. I may not use the walls of my house as a barrier to
protect information. I may think of them as a way to keep out the cold,
displaying pictures, and holding up the roof. Nonetheless, when A trains
his X-ray device on my wall and learns some personal fact about me, it
would surely be the case that A has violated my right to privacy.
Thus, even where one does not deliberately or intentionally use the
barriers that protect information as a means to keep others from learning
personal facts about oneself, it seems that breaching those barriers may
violate a right to privacy. Perhaps violating a right to privacy requires
instead that another person breach a barrier that in fact protects one’s
privacy, regardless of whether one actually intentionally uses the barrier
as a means to protect privacy.
III. BARRIER-BREACHING
Rickless states that data encryption will be a barrier, the breach of
which will constitute a violation of a privacy right.18 Thus, where A
encrypts data in order to prevent others from learning personal facts
about A, B’s decrypting that data violates A’s right to privacy on the
Barrier Theory. The Barrier Theory does not contain a requirement
that the encryption must be generally effective, however, and I
wonder whether using a barrier that happens to not work in a
particular circumstance will underwrite a right to privacy on the
Barrier Theory.
Suppose, for example, that a multilingual couple have the habit of
conversing in different languages so that they may discuss personal
matters in public spaces, but without others learning facts about them in
the process. Generally this is an effective barrier. They deliberately
choose to speak in languages that no one nearby is likely to understand.
Suppose also that the couple converse in Cantonese in a restaurant in a
small town with no known Cantonese speakers. However, there just
happens to be a person passing through town sitting at the next table who
is fluent in Cantonese. It is unclear from the Barrier Theory whether the
person at the next table breaches the relevant barrier when she
comprehends the conversation. Does she breach the barrier when she
actively listens and translates deliberately? Does she breach the barrier
when she records the conversation and later translates it with the aid of a
Cantonese-English dictionary?
My concern here is not a matter of mere line drawing; there will
always be cases in which a particular theory will be difficult to apply.
18.
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Rather, my concern is that fleshing out the Barrier Theory may demand
positing a condition that B—the person learning the personal facts about
the rightholder—take some positive action toward breaching the barrier
and acquiring personal information about the rightholder. That is, I am
not certain of the extent to which a person breaching the relevant barrier
must act to deliberately breach the barrier in order for a rights violation
to obtain.
IV. ACQUISITION AND DISSEMINATION
Thomson argues that the cluster of rights that make up the right to privacy
includes the right that others not cause one distress by publishing
personal information (as illustrated by The Picture in the News case),
and the right to confidentiality (as illustrated by The Inveterate Gossip
case).19 Rickless contends that the two cases involve wrongs, but that
those wrongs are better understood as wrongs of causing distress and
betraying confidence. Rather than multiplying rights beyond necessity,
he asserts that we may limit the right to privacy to information
acquisition. He writes that “[i]f every moral fact about the dissemination
cases can be explained without adverting to a right to privacy, then let us
simplify our moral theory by hypothesizing that the right to privacy
concerns the acquisition, but not the dissemination, of personal
information.”20
I am not sure we can do that so neatly. Take the example of the
powerful X-ray machine that can see through walls. Clearly A’s using
such a machine to watch B in her home is a violation of B’s right to
privacy on the Barrier Theory, based on A’s acquisition of information.
However, we can tweak the case to make it a violation of the right to
privacy based on dissemination. Suppose that A trains the X-ray machine
on B’s house, but rather than watching B and acquiring information, A
sets the machine to begin broadcasting the image on television and
simply walks away, never viewing the images himself. Clearly this
violates B’s right to privacy. Just as clearly, it is the dissemination of the
information that constitutes the violation, not the acquisition. Those
people acquiring information about B by turning on their televisions
do not violate B’s right to privacy any more than the neighbors who
have The Quiet Fight fill their ears on the wind of a freak weather
19.
20.

Thomson, supra note 2, at 309.
Rickless, supra note 1, at 796.
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event, even though they are the only ones who acquire information.
It is A, who has merely disseminated the information, who has violated
B’s right.
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